

Harbor Safety Committee

of the San Francisco Bay Region

*Mandated by the California Oil Spill
Prevention and Response Act of 1990*

HARBOR SAFETY COMMITTEE OF THE SF BAY REGION

Thursday, February 14, 2002

Port of San Francisco, Pier 1, San Francisco, CA

Capt. Grant Stewart, American Ship Management, Chair, called the public meeting to order at 9:30 and welcomed those in attendance. The secretariat confirmed the presence of a quorum. The following committee members or alternates were in attendance. **Len Cardoza**, Port of Oakland; **John Davey**, Port of San Francisco; **Nancy Pagan**, Port of Benicia (10:00); **Scott Merritt**, Foss Maritime; **Michael Beatie**, Golden Gate Bridge District, Ferry Division; **Capt. Larry Teague**, San Francisco Bar Pilots; **Capt. Margaret Reasoner**, Crowley Maritime; **Margot Brown**, National Boating Federation; **Marina Secchitano**, Inlandboatman's Union of the Pacific (10:00); **Joan Lundstrom**, Bay Conservation and Development Commission; and **Kathryn Zagzebski**, Marine Mammal Center (10:00). Also present were U. S. Coast Guard representatives, **Capt. Larry Hereth** (MSO); **Cdr. David Kranking**, (VTS); NOAA Representative, **Lt Cdr. Mike Gallagher**, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers representative, **David Dwinell**; OSPR representative, **Al Storm**; State Lands representative, **Ken Leveridge**; and Marine Exchange/Clearinghouse representative, **Lynn Korwatch**. In addition, more than twenty-five representatives of the maritime community and interested public were present.

The following corrections were made to the minutes of the 1-10-02 meeting. **M. Brown**: P. 1, Members Present: **M. Brown** represents the National Boating Federation. P. 2, 11 lines from bottom “. . . whenever possible, go direct to berth.” P. 2, last line, “Senator Breau.” **L. Cardoza**: P. 3, COE report was given by Jim Delory. P. 3, COE report, “There have been no changes in the status of the Oakland 50' Project or the James Baldwin Channel Project since the December HSC meeting.” P. 3, last line should be deleted and replaced with: “**L. Cardoza** reported that he works with the administration and the California Congressional Delegation to fund dredging and maritime-related construction and maintenance funding, including the corps' debris collection mission in the bay.” **L. Teague**: PORTS Report, should read: “**L. Teague**: There has been up to a two-hour difference between predictions and actual currents.” And, further down in PORTS Report, “**L. Teague**: Pilots rely on the system, but access it by phone rather than the website when actually piloting.” MOTION by **L. Teague**, seconded by **J. Lundstrom**, to “approve the minutes of the 1-10-02 meeting as amended and corrected.” Motion passed unanimously.

S. Merritt relayed a request from **M. Secchitano**, that the next HSC meeting be held in the afternoon. The National Towing Safety Advisory Committee on which she sits will be in the Bay Area for their semi-annual meeting and she would like the HSC meeting in Oakland to be held at 1:00 so they can attend. The Chair asked if anyone had issues with the change. It was noted that the Water Transit Authority meets that afternoon and some HSC members sit on the

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committee or wish to attend. In addition, **L. Cardoza** does not believe the Port of Oakland Board Room is available that afternoon.

USCG COTP'S REPORT, L. Hereth (1) **Lcdr. John Caplis**: A written report of port operations statistics for pollution response and investigations and significant port safety events for the period January 1, 2002 through January 31, 2002 is made a part of these minutes. (2) Port security is moving forward steadily on a number of issues. **Adm. Riutta** has issued PAC Area Instructions, guidelines for examining facilities for security measures in place. (3) The JACOB LUCHENBACH has been identified as the source of the San Mateo mystery spill, with cases dating back to 1993. Side-scan sonar and divers will assess the vessel's tanks. Then a determination will be made on where to go to prevent further spilling. (4) **Lt. Ross Sargeant**, currently with Waterways Management, will be taking over the Port Safety Chief position this summer. (5) **L. Hereth** reported that the port security guidelines started as a West Coast effort, including the states of Alaska and Hawaii and Guam to provide consistent security practices. They are being viewed as benchmarks. This week a letter will go to each port or facility that handles hazardous cargo, outlining the guidelines and requesting that they be implemented. The success of implementation at each location will then be assessed in the next 90 days. The East Coast was favorably impressed with these guidelines and is looking at adopting them as interim guidelines. The first meeting to look at developing regulations was held on 1-28-02. (6) The JACOB LUCHENBACH case is a classic example of how this community, NOAA and OSPR work together to focus on a problem. Cases in 1993, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2002 have all been linked to this source. This case still poses a big challenge. The 500' vessel is down in 175' of water and is in deteriorated condition. Other potential sources are still being checked. There are 102 sunken wrecks in the marine sanctuary. Some large ones are in as little as 50' of water and these will be checked. With state funding unavailable, it was the support of the Oil Spill Management Trust Fund in Washington, DC that made solving this case possible. Thanks to all who collaborated in this extensive effort that employed lots of technology, including satellite, infrared and ultraviolet, and lots of manpower, including fly-overs and recreational divers. (7) Rule 9 Violations. There have been three or four cases of navigational interference in the past month that caused concern, especially in this time of enhanced security. The CG is trying to get the word out to yacht clubs. Violators are being pursued aggressively. **D. Kranking** added that USCG Group SF, responsible for coordinating marine events, and representatives of VTS have been meeting with the various event planners and coordinators from bay area clubs. Vocal members of the commercial crab industry have met with VTS and Group SF to raise awareness of the placement of their gear and recent damage to it. The season runs to June. VTS has incorporated a reminder into the ½ hour/hourly broadcast. VTS has advised the fishermen that some vessels such as recreational boats and tugs don't use the traffic lanes, but may cut through the precautionary area. **M. Reasoner** noted that a chartlet was put out through a cooperative effort of the tugboat companies and crabbers a few years ago to show where the

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fishermen's equipment was. **D. Kranking** will check on this. **M. Brown** requested a list of the clubs that have attended meetings with the CG so she can determine who didn't and help contact them. **J. Davey** initiated discussion of security for facilities that don't handle hazardous materials, such as terminals, ferries, tug and tow operations and the pilots. The definitions in the security guidelines don't apply to these operations. **L. Hereth**: There is no consistent approach that offers a solution to this. The focus has been on the most crucial elements of maritime commerce, where the most damage could be done to people, hazardous materials and the economy. Other folks need to ratchet up security as well, and things have been done, but not with any consistency. The CG could work with the community to get out recommendations. Regarding ferry vessel terminals, the CG took a step in that direction here in SF a few months ago and is looking to bring in representatives of other facility and port operations. To date there has been no information about operations focusing on marinas, tugs, etc., but the CG is willing to work on this. **J. Davey** has been asked to comment to the DOT regarding funding issues for upgrading port facilities. **L. Hereth, J. Davey** and **Capt. Peter McIsaac** (San Francisco Bar Pilots) will meet on this issue.

CLEARINGHOUSE REPORT, A. Steinbrugge. A written report with statistics for the month of January 2002 is made a part of these minutes. There were no calls to OSPR during the month of January and no calls from pilots to report the arrival of a vessel without escort paperwork.

OSPR REPORT, A. Storm. (1) **A. Storm** commended the CG on the response to the San Mateo mystery spill, which began most recently in November 2001. It was not a high-visibility spill and so it was hard to maintain funding. The CG opening up the Oil Spill Management Trust Fund was critical to the success of the effort to solve the case. The salvage operation is on going to care for oiled birds coming ashore. 1577 oiled birds have been collected; six out of seven of those were either found dead or died in captivity (2) The National Harbor Safety Committee Conference is scheduled for Houston in March. OSPR has decided that it is not a high priority to send the Chairs of the California Harbor Safety Committees. This is due to funding problems combined with the fact that the agenda is heavily weighted to MTS issues. OSPR Administrator **Harlan Henderson** will attend.

NOAA Report, M. Gallagher. New Chart 18650, Candlestick Park to Angel Island, is coming out in April. Any additions should be submitted to **M. Gallagher** in the next two days. Chart 18666, Suisun Bay west to Pittsburg, is out now. See **M. Gallagher** for sample copies.

COE REPORT, D. Dwinell. (1) The text of the COE Report is made a part of these minutes. There has been no change in the status of the Avon Turning Basin Project because of funding issues. (2) **L. Cardoza** added that the first contract for the Port of Oakland's 50' project has been completed. He congratulated the COE for completing their work on time, on budget and

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with no accidents. One wreck has been identified in the channel. **L. Cardoza** cautioned those looking to remove wrecks to use care, oil booms, etc. **L. Cardoza** reported on the President's FY 2003 budget, which represents a 15% cut in funding for COE projects and stated that it is important to work to replace these deleted funds. A written copy of the reported budget requests and appropriations proposed within the President's budget for FY 2003 for projects of interest to the SF HSC is made a part of these minutes. Question: What about work still to be done in the Larkspur Channel? **D. Dwinell**: All of that work is funded in the 2002 budget. Question: What should be done to address the need to get COE project funding back in the budget? **L. Cardoza**: Work with the California Congressional Delegation and California's two senators. Question: Is the cut in funding for debris removal a problem? **D. Dwinell**: The proposed 20% cut could have an effect. The COE will need to assess the situation. **Eric Dohm**, San Francisco Bar Pilots: Pinole shoal is one of the most critical channels in the SF Bay Area. It is subject to shoaling and deep draft tanker traffic. **L. Cardoza**: In prioritizing projects, the COE puts deep draft harbors first, then medium draft harbors and then recreational areas. **Mike Parker**, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works (the civilian head of COE) has been invited to visit the SF Bay Area and to become familiar with the Pinole Shoal issue. **D. Dwinell**: The COE did request funding for maintenance dredging of Pinole Shoal Channel, but the President cut it. **L. Teague**: The oil companies and the Ports of Stockton and Sacramento are affected by the bottleneck at Pinole Shoal Channel. They need to work together to approach the California Congressional Delegation. Question: What was the amount in the budget for the Everglades and NY/NJ projects? **L. Cardoza**: The Everglades project funding is \$130 million in the President's budget and NY/NJ funding is \$120 million in the President's budget. And, what is of most concern is the intention to accelerate these projects, which will decrease the amount of funding available for other projects. Question: What is the nature of the NY/NJ project? **L. Cardoza**: Four harbor deepening projects, going down through bedrock. **L. Cardoza** reported that a Long Term Management Strategy workshop will be held to look at how environmental windows impact dredging. The Bay Planning Coalition and CMANC propose to look at the science behind the windows to find a balance. Dredging companies are making the decision to move equipment out of the SF Bay Area because it is tied up for a long period of time when the windows close. Question: Can California Department of Boating and Waterways help in directing attention to the need for restoration of COE funding? **L. Cardoza**: Contact Ellen Johnck at the Bay Planning Coalition.

NAVIGATION WORK GROUP REPORT, L. Teague. Avon Turning Basin Project, fund sharing. The work group's draft letter was distributed for HSC consideration and determination as to whom it should be directed. **E. Dohm**: There was discussion at the last HSC meeting concerning sending the letter to Contra Costa County. However, the county took the lead and has been the driving force for the project. With federal funding in place, the county has agreed to be the local sponsor, but needs to cost-share the local portion of the federal/local cost sharing.



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Terminal ownership has changed. The new owner, Tosoro, needs to be approached regarding the fact that this is a relatively inexpensive project with significant benefits. **Roberta Goulart**, Contra Costa County Community Development Department, will attend the next HSC meeting. It is important to have a federally marked and maintained area for turning. Currently, pilots turn in the area, but must go outside the channel to complete the turn. **J. Lundstrom** recommended the letter be amended to add language noting that the turning basin is near a particularly sensitive environmental area and that it be sent to the California Congressional Delegation with copies to the oil companies. **M. Brown** suggested that language be added to clarify that the federal share of the funding is in place and the local matching funds are needed. **K. Zagzebski** suggested a paragraph be added at the beginning of the letter stating the nature of the issue and what is needed. **P. McIsaac**: The California Congressional Delegation has already done its job. Perhaps, the HSC should wait until after hearing from **R. Goulart** and until after the Tosoro Operations Manager has been contacted. **P. McIsaac** and **L. Hereth** will meet with **R. Goulart** and get the details of project funding requirements and then approach Tosoro. **J. Lundstrom** suggested that the affected oil company representatives be invited to the next HSC meeting. **Jerry Karr**, Valero Marketing and Supply Company: The terminal operators up there have been meeting with **R. Goulart** and WSPA and have been waiting to see who the new owner of the Avon terminal would be. **J. Karr** will extend invitations to next HSC meeting. **P. McIsaac** will contact Tosoro. A possible vote on a letter will be agendaed for the next HSC meeting and **R. Goulart** will be asked to make a presentation.

UNDERWATER ROCKS WORK GROUP REPORT, L. Cardoza. The work group has not met since the last HSC meeting and has no report. The next meeting is scheduled for 2-19-02.

FERRY OPERATIONS WORK GROUP REPORT, N. Pagan (1) Letter regarding funding for debris removal. Since this is 80% funded, is a letter necessary? **L. Cardoza**: Yes, directed to the California Congressional Delegation. The COE has already done its work in requesting the funding. This is especially important since it impacts the current ferry system and the proposed fast ferry system. **N. Pagan**: The work group will rework the letter and submit it for consideration and a vote at the next HSC meeting. The Chair suggested the Water Transit Authority write a similar letter. (2) No Wake Signage. The work group proposes a four-foot square sign to be placed in eight locations around SF Bay. **Joe Bugard**, Red and White Fleet: The issue is passenger safety. 2,000,000 people board ferries at Piers 39-45 annually. Blue and Gold and Red and White Fleet have come to agreement on operating methods to increase safety. Other operators need to be approached, including the pilot boat that comes close to the shore and container ships that need to be slowing down at Crissy Field. **M. Beatie**: Bay Area ferry operators have met and agree that speed doesn't directly relate to wakes. Regulatory efforts are not recommended. **J. Bugard**: If the signage proposal progresses, a sustained educational outreach program should be added. **K. Zagzebski**: The CG should send letters to operators and

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include warnings in the *Local Notice to Mariners*. **J. Bugard:** Recreational boaters don't cause the problem. **M. Beatie:** Speed is an important component in the fast ferry business. The ferry companies are concerned about operating issues. Fast ferry companies are leery of too many signs being put up all around the bay. Question: How will a container ship see a four-foot sign on the shore? **L. Teague:** The SFBP Port Agent has put out the word to pilots to be aware of vessel wake through the Pier 39-45 area. **M. Secchitano:** Perhaps the sign should say 'caution' instead of 'slow'. **E. Dohm:** 100,000-ton vessels will create a wake at any speed. Wake can only be mitigated so much. The wake problem also exists in the Oakland estuary, with effects felt by boats moored along the channel. **J. Bugard:** The ferry operators have lived with commercial traffic for long time and appreciate the pilots' awareness. Usually, there is no problem; it's only the unusual 1%. The Chair returned the issue of signage and educational outreach to the committee for more work to develop guidelines for a complete signage and educational outreach program. The work group will meet with ferry operators. The Prevention through People Work Group will work with the Ferry Operations Work Group on this project. **L. Hereth to J. Bugard:** Is there a survey or records identifying which types of vessels are causing problems? The success of an outreach program requires knowing who to target with the educational program. **J. Bugard:** There is no official survey, but vessel logs, which show the current, speed, proximity and type of vessel, will provide the necessary information. **M. Secchitano:** Since this issue first came up, vessel operators have become more aware and logged details. **M. Beatie:** The fact that Blue and Gold and Red and White worked out their problems demonstrates that outreach and education works.

HUMAN FACTORS WORK GROUP. **Rob Hughes** reported that the propulsion failure pamphlet is working through the final draft changes. The work group will review the final draft at its next meeting and then present to the HSC for approval before going to print.

PREVENTION THROUGH PEOPLE WORK GROUP, M. Brown. (1) Boating and Waterways has printed 30,000 copies of the Channel 16 brochure and they are available from the MX. (2) The next meeting of the work group is scheduled for 2-20-02 at 0930 at the State Lands Office in Hercules. The Ferry Operations Work Group could attend that meeting to address issues discussed earlier.

TUG ESCORT WORK GROUP REPORT, J. Lundstrom. The work group met on 1-15-02, with twenty-five people in attendance, to continue the review of the basis of the existing tug/tanker matching matrix and to determine whether new information should lead to a recommendation to revise the matrix. The group based their findings on review of David Gray's work, Glosten Associates; Sea River Maritime sea trials; statistics submitted by the MX; the pilot's report on the M/T ACOAXET incident and the initial conclusions that were the basis of the current matrix. The group concluded that the tug/tanker matrix remains valid and should not

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be modified. The work group will pursue review of other aspects of the tug/tanker escort procedures and will report any recommendations to the HSC. A sub-committee was formed to address emergency procedures training for interaction between tugs and tankers. The intent is not to develop regulations, but to develop guidelines. Draft guidelines will be discussed at the next work group meeting scheduled for 3-12-02 at the State Lands Office, 10:00. The work group will also revisit the recommendation to have tankers carrying dangerous cargo escorted.

PORTS REPORT, A. Steinbrugge. The Oakland wind sensor was repaired and has been fully functional for three weeks. The prototype Benicia current meter is now scheduled for installation in April. NOAA is looking at whether they can re-deploy the old sensor on the bottom or find another method of deployment. Re-deploying it as in the past is not the ideal interim solution because this installation requires costly monthly maintenance to keep it unburied. The instrument has been recovered along with some cable, but deploying it in the same way subjects it to having the cable broken repeatedly. CalTrans is working on installing a power source on the bridge for the equipment.

OLD BUSINESS. A. Steinbrugge noted that a list of committee members is distributed at this meeting. Corrections should be submitted in writing by e-mail or fax to the MX.

NEW BUSINESS. (1) The Chair read and distributed a letter to the committee from **G. Lundeberg**, alternate labor representative to the HSC regarding STCW 95 compliance. The International Maritime Organization recently decided not to strictly enforce the provisions of the International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers until 8-1-02. American merchant mariners have been in compliance with STCW 95 since it went into effect on 2-1-02. In his letter he indicated his belief that the decision compromised national security and harbor safety by permitting foreign-flag vessels to transit U.S. Harbors with crews that have not been certified in accordance with the Convention. He requested that the issue be put before the HSC for discussion and that the sentiments of the HSC be forwarded to the IMO and the Commandant, USCG. The Chair placed the issue with the Prevention through People Work Group for review and development of a position. The issue will be agendaed for a possible vote at the next HSC meeting. **M. Secchitano** concurred with **G. Lundeberg** that the problem compromises national security and safety because it allows for ships to transit without certified crews while U. S. vessels are in compliance. **S. Merritt:** The decision doesn't defer training requirements. **L. Hereth:** That's true, but there will be no enforcement until August because of administrative complexities. The CG bought into this reluctantly. **M. Secchitano:** Not all countries have allowed this. There are some countries that are enforcing the Convention effective 2-1-02. (2) **Doug Lathrop**, Chevron Texaco, suggested the HSC get an update from State Lands on maritime facility security efforts on the state level. **Ken Leveridge**, State Lands Commission: Emergency guidelines have passed out of State

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Lands Commission and to the State Inter-Agency Oil Spill Committee. From there they will go to the Office of Administrative Law and then will become emergency regulations. At that point, a 120-day period will begin for the development of permanent regulations. A technical advisory group will be put together to work on the regulations and will work with the CG to ensure that the permanent regulations are in sync with federal regulations. A State Lands representative will update the HSC at the March meeting. (3) **M. Reasoner** suggested that the HSC send a letter to the California Congressional Delegation regarding the hundreds of thousands of dollars in funding for dredging in Bay Area ports. **L. Cardoza** will draft a letter for the consideration of the committee at its next meeting.

Rick Holly, OSPR, presented an overview of the BC States Task Report on West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Routing and the resultant recommendations. The task force looked at vessels over 300 gross tons and the risk of things that would cause drift grounding. They looked at current voluntary agreements, current traffic patterns and traffic, vessel traffic systems, VTS and sanctuaries. They conducted a drift analysis study; developed a tug response model and a risk assessment model; did a casualty analysis; identified the number of assist vessels capable of controlling drift in severe weather; calculated onshore drift rate towards shore; determined where a tug would need to be to prevent a drift grounding; and prepared a summary of average drift rate/tug response. The model adjusts for tug readiness to respond in addition to location. Various work groups ran scenarios on ten points for nine factors and defined the higher risk areas. And, finally, the task force looked at measures to mitigate risk, reviewed funding and developed recommendations. The *Public Comment Draft: Findings and Recommendations of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup* was distributed and is made a part of these minutes. Public outreach, public review and comment period is December, 2001 – March, 2002; adoption of final findings and recommendations, April, 2002; presentation to principals, July, 2002. The task force website is: <http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeb/taskforc/tfhome.htm>. Comments should be submitted to Jean Cameron, Executive Director, Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force, P.O. Box 1032, Neskowin, OR 97149; JeanRCameron@oregoncoast.com.

M. Secchitano suggested the March HSC meeting be moved to the afternoon to accommodate attendance by members of the National Towing Safety Advisory Committee who will be holding their semi-annual meeting from 8:00 – 12:00 at Port of SF meeting room. This group usually meets in Washington, DC and it would be good for them to attend an SF HSC meeting. The Chair indicated the conflicts discussed earlier in the meeting.

The next meeting of the HSC will be held at 1000 hours at the Port of Oakland on 3-14-02.


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MOTION by **L. Teague**, seconded by **M. Brown** to “adjourn the meeting.” Motion was passed without objection. Meeting adjourned at 1220.

Respectfully submitted,



Captain Lynn Korwatch
Executive Secretary

USCG Marine Safety Office San Francisco Bay
Port Operations Statistics
For 1 to 31 January 2002

PORT SAFETY:	TOTAL
• SOLAS Interventions/COTP Orders:	5
• Propulsion Casualties	0
• Steering Casualties:	1
• Collisions/Allisions:	0
• Groundings	2

POLLUTION RESPONSE:	MSO
Total oil pollution incidents within San Francisco Bay for the month:	25
▪ Source Identification; Discharges and Potential Discharges from:	
Deep Draft Vessels	3
Facilities (includes all non-vessel)	2
Military/Public Vessels	0
Commercial Fishing Vessels	0
Other Commercial Vessels	0
Non-Commercial Vessels (e.g. pleasure craft)	13
Unknown Source (as of the end of the month)	7
▪ Spill Volume:	
Unconfirmed	9
No Spill, Potential Needing Action	0
Spills < 10 gallons	11
Spills 10 to 100 gallons	4
Spills 100 to 1000 gallons	1
Spills > 1000 gallons	0

Significant Cases:

JAN - Ongoing investigation/assessment/recovery operations into San Mateo Mystery Spill with subsequent confirmation of the wreck SS JACOB LUCKENBACH as source.

02 JAN – T/V NAUTILUS (CY) agent notified MSO of failing port anchor shackle pin. COTP Order was issued requiring vessel to transit under escort of tugs and not depart until repairs were made. Vessel anchor pin was fixed and COTP Order was rescinded.

07 JAN – T/V CEFALONIA (PN) grounded while proceeding to the Port of Stockton to offload. COTP order was issued to have the vessel transit to anchorage in San Francisco Bay for an underwater hull examination. The divers were only able to complete 60% of the examination. Based on the surveyor's recommendations, the COTP order was rescinded and vessel departed port to have examination completed at NPOC in calmer waters. Vessel departed port without incident.

08 JAN – T/V CEFALONIA (PN) had both radars reading 2 degrees off. COTP order was issued ordering the vessel to remain moored until repairs were made. Repairs were made and COTP order was rescinded.

09 JAN – M/V PLANET (CY) had an inoperable radar and the gyro was off by 25 degrees. COTP Order was issued ordering vessel not to proceed if visibility was less than one mile and not to leave the bay until repairs were made. Repairs were made and COTP Order was rescinded.

23 JAN – T/V JAG VAYU (IN) was issued a COTP Order requiring vessel to proceed directly to destination to offload product of anhydrous ammonia. Vessel proceeded, off-loaded and departed bay. COTP Order was rescinded.

29 JAN – M/V Heinrich Oldendorff (LI) ran aground soft aground enroute to Pittsburg. Vessel transited to Diablo Services where class society cleared vessel.

30 JAN – M/V RJ Pfiefer (US) had a fire on one of the diesel generators lagging. Fire was extinguished by Oakland F.D.

San Francisco Bay Clearinghouse Report For January 2002

San Francisco Bay Region Totals

			2001
Tanker arrivals to San Francisco Bay	50		59
Total tank ship & tank barge movements	241		292
Tank ship movements	158	65.56%	191
Escorted tank ship movements	74	30.71%	100
Unescorted tank ship movements	84	34.85%	91
Tank barge movements	83	34.44%	101
Escorted tank barge movements	50	20.75%	50
Unescorted tank barge movements	33	13.69%	51
Percentages above are percent of total tank ship & tank barge movements for each item.			
Escorts reported to OSPR	0		0

Movements by Zone	Zone 1	%	Zone 2	%	Zone 4	%	Zone 6	%	Total	%
Total movements	145		229		0		126		500	
Unescorted movements	70	48.28%	113	49.34%	0	0.00%	61	48.41%	244	48.80%
Tank ships	48	33.10%	83	36.24%	0	0.00%	40	31.75%	171	34.20%
Tank barges	22	15.17%	30	13.10%	0	0.00%	21	16.67%	73	14.60%
Escorted movements	75	51.72%	116	50.66%	0	0.00%	65	51.59%	256	51.20%
Tank ships	41	28.28%	69	30.13%	0	0.00%	36	28.57%	146	29.20%
Tank barges	34	23.45%	47	20.52%	0	0.00%	29	23.02%	110	22.00%

Notes:

1. Information is only noted for zones where escorts are required.
2. All percentages are percent of total movements for the zone.
3. Every movement is counted in each zone transited during the movement.
4. Total movements is the total of all unescorted movements and all escorted movements.

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**Report of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San Francisco District**

14 February 2002

1. CORPS 2002 O&M DREDGING PROGRAM

- a. *Main Ship Channel* – March – April 2002 timeframe – Corps dredge Essayons scheduled to perform this work.
- b. *Richmond Outer and Southampton* - March – April 2002 timeframe – Corps dredge Essayons scheduled to perform this work.
- c. *Richmond Inner* – May – June 2002 time frame – Ocean Disposal.
- d. *Oakland (Inner & Outer)* – June – July 2002 timeframe – Ocean Disposal.
- e. *Suisun Bay Channel* - June – July 2002 timeframe – Upland Disposal.
- f. **San Rafael** – This is a congressional addition to the Corps budget – In-Bay/winter Island Disposal.
- g. **Petaluma** – This is a congressional addition to the Corps budget – Upland Disposal.
- h. **Larkspur** - August - September 2002 timeframe – In-Bay Disposal at Alcatraz. Anticipate a late start because of environmental window in one location of the channel

Note: Corps is presently working with the Regional Water Quality Control Board for our Waste Discharge Requirement (WDR) and the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission for our Consistency Determination. Both are required so we can implement our 2002 maintenance dredging program.

2. DEBRIS REMOVAL

The total tonnage of debris collected on the San Francisco Bay for January 2002 was approximately 263 tons. This is up from the 137 tons for January. The Raccoon only operated three days because of rudder damage, but collected 45 tons during the three-day period. The Raccoon is now in the shipyard for rudder repairs and should be

out by the 19th or 20th of this month. The Grizzly and Seahawk remain in service full time.

3. UNDERWAY OR UPCOMING HARBOR IMPROVEMENTS

a. **Oakland 50-ft** – Construction is underway. Presently finishing work on first Construction contract for first demolition. Corps has scheduled bid opening for second contract for 27 February 2002. The second contract will cover the Inner Harbor Turning Basin Phase I A-2. The Corps has received approximately 8.4 million dollars for the project this year. Corps continues to work on additional contracts. Plan to issue additional contracts this year.

b. **S.F. Rock Removal Feasibility Study** -

The 50% Administrative Draft of the EIS/R has been completed, reviewed and revisions accomplished. Copies were provided to the other Agencies around 1 February. Alternatives formulation will be a major portion of work for the 100% Administrative Draft.

A contract for a Risk Model is still under negotiation. This contract should be awarded shortly. We were scheduled to receive the draft oil spill model on 12 February. This model should provide the first estimate of damage caused by an oil spill. This will be used to balance against the cost of removing the rocks.

c. **Avon Turning Basin.**

Status unchanged.

Congress added \$250,000 this FY to prepare a General Reevaluation Report (GRR) and evaluate the feasibility of constructing a Turning Basin at Avon. This Basin is part of the un-constructed Phase III, John F. Baldwin Ship Channel project. To initiate this study the COE has prepared a Study Plan and has submitted a draft 50/50 cost sharing agreement to Contra Costa County, for their consideration. Contra Costa County is negotiating with the users of the two terminals at Avon to obtain funds for their portion of the cost sharing. At the last meeting, it was reported that this is being held up by the sale of one of the users. No additional progress to report.

4. EMERGENCY DREDGING

We continue to monitor the problem area in the Suisun Channel that has required emergency dredging in the past. We just completed a hydrographic survey that showed this area to be ok. The information has been provided to the pilots. Next scheduled to be surveyed in early April.

5. CORPS' BUDGET

Corps has received the funds for projects scheduled this year. After review of the funding for this year, there is some concern we could be short of funds. However, this will depend on the actual shoaling rates on our projects. However, the Corps still intends to complete all projects scheduled for this year. The Corps budget contains congressional additions for San Rafael and Petaluma maintenance dredging.

6. OTHER WORK

The San Francisco District and the Sacramento District are looking at a joint feasibility study to deepen the JFB Ship Channel from Avon to Stockton. This would be only 1 or 2 feet. Reconnaissance Study was performed a couple of years ago. Division has given ok to proceed with study. Details of the study still need to be worked out.

The Port of Stockton and Contra Costa County have agreed in principle to cost share the study. We are setting a meeting for the end of this month to work out additional details of the study.

FY 03 President's Budget

Depicted below are budget requests and appropriations proposed within the president's Budget for FY2003 for projects of interest to S.F. Bay HSC

Project	Recommendation	FY 2003 President's Budget	Purpose of Funding
Navigation Studies in Progress			
San Francisco Bay (Rocks Removal)	\$300,000.00	\$225,000.00	Continue feasibility
Port of Stockton (Deep Water Ship Channel)	\$300,000.00	\$100,000.00	Continue feasibility
Continuing Construction			
Oakland Harbor (-50 Ft Deepening)	\$50,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	Continue construction
Sacramento Deep Water Ship Channel	\$350,000.00	\$250,000.00	Continue construction
Port of Stockton (Avon Turning Basin)	\$2,300,000.00	\$0.00	Continue construction
Operations and Maintenance			
Oakland Harbor	\$12,000,000.00	\$11,204,000.00	Maintenance Dredging
Petaluma River	\$5,500,000.00	\$0.00	Maintenance Dredging
Project Condition Surveys	\$1,500,000.00	\$1,130,000.00	Federal Project Condition surveys
Richmond Harbor	\$8,000,000.00	\$4,381,000.00	Maintenance Dredging
Sacramento Deep Water Ship Channel	\$2,200,000.00	\$2,189,000.00	Maintenance Dredging
San Francisco Bay Delta Model	\$2,400,000.00	\$1,181,000.00	Operate and Maintain
San Francisco Bay Long Term Management Strategy (Dredging)	\$1,500,000.00	\$0.00	Study impacts of methyl mercury
San Francisco Bay (Bar Channel)	\$2,000,000.00	\$1,920,000.00	Maintenance Dredging
San Francisco Bay (Debris Removal)	\$2,500,000.00	\$2,072,000.00	Debris Removal
San Joaquin River - Stockton Ship Channel	\$3,800,000.00	\$2,122,000.00	Maintenance Dredging
San Pablo Bay Pinole Shoal	\$7,000,000.00	\$0.00	Maintenance Dredging
San Rafael Canal	\$1,000,000.00	\$0.00	Maintenance Dredging
Suisun Bay Channel, New York Slough	\$7,000,000.00	\$2,815,000.00	Maintenance Dredging
	\$109,650,000.00	\$34,589,000.00	

February 11, 2002

DRAFT
AVON TURNING BASIN LETTER

Dear

At the December 9, 1999 meeting of the Harbor Safety Committee for the San Francisco Bay Region, the issue of developing a turning basin in the vicinity of Avon was raised. The recent court decision against a Pilot for the 1997 grounding of the tanker, Chesapeake Trader, while turning off Avon has brought the subject to light once again. The San Francisco Bar Pilots first raised the issue of a need for a turning basin in this area in 1991. The original turning basin design was incorporated into the J.F. Baldwin Channel Improvement Project. This project called for deepening the navigation channel to 42 feet and was subsequently shelved. Along with it, the turning basin was also shelved even though the reasons for canceling the JFB Project were not related to the justification and need for the basin.

Through the efforts of the Contra Costa County Water Agency (CCCWA), Congress has directed the Army Corps of Engineers to prepare a General Reevaluation Report (GRR) using the existing JFB authorization in order to develop the Avon Turning Basin. Originally, it was thought that this would be 100% Federally funded. However, this was clarified to require a cost sharing agreement with the non-Federal sponsor (Contra Costa County Water Agency). Currently, the project is being held up awaiting a cost sharing between the CCCWA and the terminals that utilize this turning area.

The Avon Marine Terminal and Shore Terminal, LLC, Martinez, are two marine terminals in Suisun Bay, on the shores of Contra Costa County that are used exclusively by tankers and tank barges carrying petroleum products. The only way for large tankers to utilize these facilities is to turn outside the navigation channel in an area that is not maintained or surveyed on a regular basis. This area is not clearly delineated and is subject to shoaling. Vessels have a limited window of opportunity to turn with sufficient tide and minimal current. By establishing a formal turning basin that is part of the Federal Channel project, not only would the area be maintained at a proper depth, it would be surveyed by the Corps on a regular basis. Adding proper USCG Aids to Navigation would provide a safe, clearly marked area for tankers utilizing these facilities to turn.

The Harbor Safety Committee for the San Francisco Bay Region recognizes the importance of this project to promote safe navigation and to protect the environmentally sensitive waters of Suisun Bay. We strongly endorse this project and would urge that all parties involved proceed in a timely manner to bring this project to a successful completion.

Lt. Orange

Dk. Orange

SLOW

MINIMUM WAKE AREA

White



Tuesday, January 15, 2002, Tug Escort Work Group
10:00 a.m., State Lands Commission Office, 724-B Alfred Noble Drive, Hercules

1. Continue Review and Discussion of Tug/Tanker Matching Matrix.
Please bring to the meeting the following information which the Marine Exchange provided you via e-mail. (If you have not received this information, please contact Alan Steinbrugge at the Marine Exchange).
 - Methods and Assumptions Used in Calculation of the Default Selection Matrix by David Gray, Glosten Assoc. as Presented to the Tug Escort Work Group on Nov. 7, 2001
 - Long Beach Full Scale Trials, Sea River Maritime
 - Strait of Georgia Full Scale Trials, Sea River Maritime
 - Marine Exchange Total Tanker Arrivals for 2000 in San Francisco Bay
 - Graph: Frequency of Deadweight Tonnage Arriving in San Francisco Bay in 2000
 - Pilot Incident Report of Main Engine Failure M/T Acoaxet, October 26, 2001, Capt. Gregg Waugh
2. Summarize implications of the above information and potential next steps.
3. Date of next meeting and topic.

Joan Lundstrom, Chair
Email: jlundstrom@ci.larkspur.ca.us
Phone: (415)461-4566

PUBLIC COMMENT DRAFT
Findings and Recommendations of
The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project
Workgroup

I. Regarding Collision Hazards on the West Coast

1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that the risk of vessel collisions increases with traffic density. One area of increased traffic density is at port entrances. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup therefore recommends that Harbor Safety Committees or their equivalents in West Coast ports continuously monitor this risk and evaluate the need for enhanced traffic safety systems in their ports.
2. Based on their survey of coastal transits for July of 1998 through June of 1999, the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that coastwise traffic density is relatively higher along the section of the West Coast between the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Los Angeles/Long Beach than either north of the Strait or south of LA/LB. The coastal sections of highest density within this area are those between the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Columbia River, and between San Francisco and Los Angeles/Long Beach.

While we recognize that the transit numbers for that period represent only one snapshot in time, according to our best professional judgment we foresee no major changes to that relative volume pattern. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup anticipates that the pending AIS carriage requirement, when fully implemented, could significantly reduce any collision hazard in these areas of relatively higher traffic density. We therefore recommend that the maritime and towing industry operating on the West Coast consider implementing compatible AIS carriage in advance of the required schedule. Because the Workgroup feels that AIS carriage will be adequate, they find that the risk of collisions associated with these traffic densities does not justify a recommendation for a traffic monitoring or control scheme covering the entire West Coast. This finding is not intended to preempt local decisions to monitor compliance with traffic separation schemes or Areas To Be Avoided.

3. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Workgroup finds that different offshore ballast water exchange standards have been adopted by California, Oregon, and Washington and the Port of Vancouver, BC. Although the Project Workgroup does not find that these differing standards impose an increased risk of collision offshore, we recommend that the US Coast Guard, in consultation with Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Transport Canada, and consistent with IMO actions, adopt a single set of preemptive national or regional offshore ballast water exchange standards that would enhance the consistency of navigation for the purpose of ballast water exchange on the West Coast.

II. Regarding Historic Casualty Factors:

Vessel casualty data collected for this study indicate that there were over 800 marine casualties involving vessels 300 gross tons or larger reported along the West Coast of North America from 1992 to 1999. Ninety-six of these casualties fall within the scope of this report as "offshore" (3-200 nm) casualties which had a potential for a significant oil spill. These casualties ranged from mechanical failures to collisions or groundings-- basically, any incident that may have caused an oil spill of 1000 gallons or more. Overall, the Workgroup found that incidents involving mechanical and equipment failures do occur off the West Coast with enough regularity - an average of 12 times/year over the study period - to justify their concern that such incidents could result in drift groundings and the release of oil and other hazardous materials into the environment.

1. The Workgroup finds that a heavy concentration of reported casualty positions near major ports can be discerned as one trend. This may be due to higher traffic density in these areas as well as to the fact that ships conduct their status review of steering and propulsion systems 12 hours prior to entering US waters, and thus the incidents are reported/monitored more closely (loss of steering was the most common type of equipment failure). The USCG Marine Safety Office Puget Sound has worked with the Puget Sound Steamship Operators Association to develop a recommended "Standard of Care" covering maintenance procedures, preventive measures, and actions in the event of a power loss. The Workgroup recommends adoption of a similar Standard of Care by other West Coast US ports and encourages Canadian authorities and industry to examine the applicability in Western Canadian waters as well.
2. The Workgroup also found that cracks and fractures in the tank vessel cargo tanks were the most common type of structural failure identified in the casualty data. Structural stress for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) trade tankers is not unusual, considering that these tankers routinely transit through the harsh environment of Gulf of Alaska. Moreover, TAPS tankers are subject to very stringent inspection and reporting standards, which may skew the reported vessel casualties to include a high number of tanker incidents. The Workgroup anticipates that such incident frequency will decrease as new double-hull replacements come on line for the existing TAPS fleet. The Workgroup recommends continued vigilance by the US Coast Guard's inspection program as that fleet ages, and encourages TAPS tanker operators to consider expedited replacement schedules.
3. The Workgroup also found that cargo/freight ships had the highest number of casualties overall, but notes that this vessel type also represents the greatest number of offshore transits. The resultant overall rate of casualties per transits of 0.054% represents a low average casualty risk. We also find that these vessels are subject to national and international safety and environmental regulations.
4. Fishing vessels also ranked high in the mechanical/equipment failure category; their overall rate of casualties per transits was 0.384%. Based upon the Workgroup's examination of existing and proposed programs sponsored by both government and the fishing industry to improve safety overall, the Workgroup recommends implementation of the US Coast Guard's Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Action Plan.¹ The Workgroup also recognizes

¹ See copies of Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council, April – June 2001, pages 61-62 at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/pubs/proceed/q2-01.pdf>. The eight long-term action items identified in the plan include completing a regulatory project on stability and watertight integrity for certain fishing vessels; improving casualty investigation and analysis; mandatory vessel examinations; and mandatory training-based certificate programs for operators and crew.

the State of Washington's Fishing Vessel Inspection program as a good model for fishing vessel inspections that focus on reducing accidents caused by human error.²

5. The Workgroup looked into casualty rate reductions to be expected as a result of implementation of the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code), which is being phased in through July of 2002, as well as the 1995 Amendments to the Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) which are being phased in through February of 2002. The Workgroup finds that any risk reduction trends attributable to these measures should be discernable after full implementation.

III. Regarding Rescue Tug Availability on the West Coast:

1. Based on a 2000-2001 inventory, the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup found that approximately 182 ocean-going tugs operate out of West Coast "home ports." Of these, 77 were found to be capable of severe weather rescues. The Project Workgroup further finds that the capability of potential rescue vessels on the West Coast has improved greatly in recent years with the construction and placement of numerous state-of-the-art tugs with greater horsepower, maneuverability and other high technology equipment.
2. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup conducted an analysis of the probable response times of these rescue tugs from their home ports under severe weather conditions, assuming that a disabled vessel is drifting towards shore and no other means is available to stop its drift. Based upon this analysis, the Workgroup finds that a tug is not likely to be available in time to prevent a drift grounding if a vessel were to become disabled within a range varying from 36 to 216 miles offshore, depending upon the exact location on the coast. The Workgroup therefore recommends that the US and Canadian Coast Guards issue Broadcast Notices to Mariners or use NAVTEX on the West Coast during severe weather events which would advise vessels to stay a safe distance off shore, as defined by this response time analysis.
3. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that the International Tug of Opportunity System (ITOS) which operates in the US/Canadian transboundary waters of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound may also provide information on tug movements from Cook Inlet to San Diego when participating tugs travel to those locations. ITOS does not guarantee the availability of rescue tugs, but it does provide information on the location of possible rescue tugs. The Workgroup finds that the availability of such information coastwise would improve the likelihood of timely rescue of a disabled vessel. In addition, a tug of opportunity system supplements information where a VTS system exists, and helps to fill the gap where there is no VTS. The Workgroup understands that not all tugs carrying transponders are large enough to provide assistance to large vessels under worst-case wind conditions, but recognizes that smaller tugs may be able to assist smaller vessels under average conditions. Our primary goal is to enhance information about what tug is close enough to help.

² Washington's inspection standards for fishing vessels can be found at <http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/prevention/Fishing%20Vessel%20Accepted%20Industry%20Standards.pdf>

The Workgroup further finds that a coast-wide tug of opportunity system capability would be enhanced by increasing the number of participating tugs carrying transponders. There are currently 100+ vessels with transponders and 30-50 additional tugs that could be added to this number. The Workgroup recommends that the American Waterways Operators (AWO) encourage its member companies representing these additional tugs to invest in transponders and become participants in a coastwise Tug of Opportunity System. We estimate that transponder installation would cost approximately US \$3000 each.

4. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup also finds that the coastwise signal tracking system for tug transponders could be improved by adding up to nine additional signal receiving stations (two in Oregon and seven in California). There are currently stations operating in Puget Sound, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. When the IMO mandated AIS requirements are fully operational in 2007 this could improve information on rescue vessel availability on the West Coast. The Workgroup recommends that the US Coast Guard, the States of Oregon and California, and the maritime industry associations or marine exchanges in those states collaborate to review and investigate the costs and benefits of installing and maintaining these signal receiving stations or similar systems. The Project Workgroup estimates that signal receiver base stations cost approximately US \$6,000 each to install and annual system operation costs are estimated to run around US \$56,000. The Workgroup further recommends that the US Coast Guard ensure access to this information beyond the ITOS area so that their marine safety offices and/or VTS centers on the West Coast can target the tugs closest to a vessel in distress when needed.
5. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that where the tug availability risk factor is high due to a lack of readily available severe weather rescue tugs as identified by our analysis – for instance, off the Queen Charlotte Islands in British Columbia or in the Gulf of Alaska beyond the Prince William Sound area – there are several possible measures or combinations of measures available to reduce that risk, including investment in a dedicated rescue tug, creation of a stand-by tug fund, or adoption of regulations requiring rescue tug contracts held by vessel operators.

We find that dedicated rescue tugs are expensive investments³ and that funding schemes vary from federal funding in the UK, France, and South Africa to private funding for a tug stationed at Hinchinbrook Alaska, to state funding for a tug stationed at Neah Bay, Washington during the winter months⁴.

Regarding a regulatory approach, we find that the US Coast Guard is developing salvage contract requirements as part of the oil spill contingency plans covering tank vessels; their final rule is not expected to be completed until 2004. The State of California has salvage and rescue tug contract requirements that applied to tank vessel contingency plans effective 7/1/2000, and similar regulations that will apply to non-tank vessel contingency plans effective 7/1/2002.

Another possible measure is a stand-by fund. In the US, such a fund could be supported by both state and federal appropriations that provide funding for a Captain of the Port decision to require an assist tug(s) when circumstances warrant such a preventive measure. In Canada, authority exists to require a rescue tug to stand-by a vessel if the threat of pollution

³ \$2,555,000 annual operating costs were estimated (based on \$7000/day for the tug at Neah Bay), which is only on station for a six month period.

⁴ The State of Washington has recommended that the federal government assume funding.

is imminent; the resulting cost is then the subject of legal interpretation. Canadian authorities could consider use of a stand-by fund to cover the cost of such cases.

IV. Regarding the Distance Offshore Risk Factor:

1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that the risk of a grounding/collision generally increases the closer a vessel transits to shore. Using a relative ranking/risk-indexing model that incorporated nine risk factors (volume of oil/vessel design factor, drift factor, higher collision factor, distance offshore factor, weather/seasonal factor, tug availability factor, coastal route/density factor, historical casualty factor, and environmental sensitivity factor), the workgroup mapped areas of higher risk along the West Coast of Canada and the United States. The workgroup finds that vessels transiting within these higher risk areas have a greater potential for a grounding due to one or more of the risk criteria than if they transited offshore of these areas.
2. The Project Workgroup would like public comment on the following alternative proposals for establishing and communicating a safe distance offshore for coastwise traffic:

Proposal #1:

The workgroup undertook the delineation of these higher risk areas by drawing tangential rhumb lines between the "higher risk" areas and connected these lines to either a tangent drawn on the seaward boundaries of existing Areas to Be Avoided (ATBAs) or marine sanctuaries, or to the terminus of existing Traffic Separation Schemes (TSSs). In most cases, the resulting "line" was generally 25 miles from land along the entire West Coast. In some instances however, particularly around major headlands, the tangential line came closer than 25 miles to land. These areas include the Queen Charlotte Islands, Cape Blanco, Cape Mendocino, and Cape Beale. Anecdotal information indicates vessels generally transit between 10 and 33 nautical miles off most major headlands. The workgroup recommends that vessels voluntarily transit at least 25 nautical miles from land, including around headlands, and finds that such voluntary action would decrease the risk of drift groundings in the event of a vessel casualty such as loss of propulsion. The workgroup therefore recommends that the resulting inshore area be avoided by transiting vessels except when entering or leaving port. The workgroup finds that establishing traffic lanes at certain distances offshore for particular types of vessel, or establishing a Traffic Separation Scheme around headlands, would be counterproductive to risk reduction as it might result in greater collision risks due to a congregation of vessels in particular tracks.

In order to reduce the risk of groundings, the workgroup recommends that these "higher risk" areas be depicted on nautical charts, and that advisories be printed in nautical publications. The workgroup recommends that the US and Canadian Coast Guards investigate timely and effective implementation measures for depicting these higher risk areas on charts.

Proposal #2:

The Workgroup performed an exercise whereby rhumb lines depicting normal routes for vessels transiting between the major Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) and port entrances were superimposed over the charts showing the areas of "higher risk," in an effort to determine those areas on the coast where normal vessel traffic brings vessels inshore of these areas of "higher risk." The results of this exercise indicate that the vast majority of

vessels are traveling outside of these designated "higher risk" areas during their normal North-South transits. The exceptions are certain geographical areas which jut offshore of the coastline forcing vessels on coastal transits to navigate around them. The areas identified by the study are as follows:

- A) Queen Charlotte's
- B) Cape Blanco
- C) Cape Mendocino
- D) Cape Beale

These areas represent positions where vessels would make course changes as they follow North-South transits and would naturally approach closer to shore. Industry members made an informal survey of mariners to determine the distance normally traveled offshore of these points. Anecdotal information collected indicates that vessels travel at a variety of distances offshore of these points, with a range of collected data between 10 and 33 nautical miles.

As normal vessel traffic does not take vessels inshore of the "higher risk" areas except when entering or leaving port, the Workgroup recommends that placing appropriate language in the Coast Pilot publication advising mariners of the increased risk of grounding following propulsion failure within the areas determined to be of "higher risk" is sufficient for the coastline overall. For the four areas listed above where vessels normally approach closer to shore, the workgroup suggests that a minimum offshore distance of 30 nautical miles be recommended for those areas.

3. The workgroup recognizes that the Tanker Exclusion Zone in Western Canada establishes a voluntary minimum distance from shore for all tankers operating in those waters. The workgroup further recognizes that laden tankers operated by members of the Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) have agreed since 1992 to a voluntary policy of transiting at least 50 miles offshore of the US West Coast. The workgroup is currently working with both WSPA and INTERTANKO to extend that policy to non-WSPA tankers transiting the US West Coast.
4. In addition, the Workgroup recognizes that laden tank barges operated by members of the American Waterways Operators have agreed to a voluntary policy of transiting at least 25 miles offshore of the US West Coast. The Council of Marine Carriers in British Columbia has committed to a similar policy for its laden tank barges transiting in the open ocean off the West Coast of Canada, but also maintains the longstanding practice of tugs seeking refuge in the many inlets available along the BC coastline which may be the safer action under certain circumstances.

V. Other Findings and Recommendations:

DATA

1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that due to the configuration of the databases currently in use by US and Canadian federal agencies, information on cause and outcome of casualties is difficult to extract. We note that the US Coast Guard and the Canadian Transportation Safety Board are revising their vessel casualty databases, and recommend that they design the systems to allow for improved access to information on both the causes and outcomes of reported incidents.
2. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup recommends that the US and Canadian Coast Guards continue to coordinate with marine exchanges and other appropriate organizations to further improve coast-wise data collection procedures covering vessel movements in order to provide more detailed and standardized information regarding vessel types, cargo, and Ports of origin.

MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup recommends that the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force work with the US and Canadian Coast Guards in five years to review the efficacy of the final recommendations from this project.

Please submit comments no later than March 31 to:

Jean R. Cameron
Executive Coordinator
Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force
PO Box 1032
Neskowin, OR 97149-1032
503-392-5860 (phone/fax)
JeanRCameron@oregoncoast.com (email)

HSC file



of the Pacific

TELEPHONE (415) 777 3400
AREA NUMBER "SAILORS"
FAX (415) 777 5088

BRANCHES PHONE
SEATTLE 98104 • 1253 SIXTH AVE. SOUTH, SUITE A • (206) 467 7944
WILMINGTON 90714 • 533 N. MARINE AVE. • (310) 835 6617
HONOLULU 96813 • 707 ALAKEA ST. • (808) 333 2777
GUNNAR LUNDEBERG • PRESIDENT/SECRETARY-TREASURER

HEADQUARTERS: 450 HARRISON STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94105

February 7, 2002

Capt. Grant Stewart
Chairman
Harbor Safety Committee
of the San Francisco Bay Region
c/o American Ship Management, LLC.
2175 North California Blvd, Suite 1000
Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Dear Capt. Stewart: ^{GRANT} RE: STCW 95 Compliance

As a member of the Harbor Safety Committee since its inception I am appalled at the recent decision of the International Maritime Organization to not strictly enforce the provisions of the International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995, until August 1, 2002.

The decision compromises national security and harbor safety by permitting foreign-flag vessels to transit our harbors with crews that have not been certified in accordance with the Convention. It should be noted that American merchant mariners have been compliance with STCW 95 since it went into effect on February 1, 2002

Although I will be out-of-town on February 14, I request that this issue be placed on the agenda for Committee discussion and that the sentiments of the Committee be forwarded to the IMO and Admiral James Loy, Commandant USCG.

With best regards, I remain.

Sincerely,

GUNNAR LUNDEBERG
President/Secretary-Treasurer

GL:mv
ope-3-afl-cio (146)
c: Capt. Lynn Korwatch, Executive Director (Marine Exchange)
Marina V. Secchitano, Harbor Safety Committee