Harbor Safety Committee of the San Francisco Bay Region
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Bayside Conference Center, Port of San Francisco, San Francisco, California

Joan Lundstrom, Chair of the Harbor Safety Committee of the San Francisco Bay Region (HSC), San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC); called the meeting to order at 1004.

Capt. Lynn Korwatch, Marine Exchange of the San Francisco Bay Region (Marine Exchange), confirmed a quorum of the HSC.

Committee members (M) and alternates (A) in attendance with a vote: Capt. Esam Amso (A), Valero Marketing and Supply Company; John Berge (M), Pacific Merchant Shipping Association (PMSA); Ted Blanckenburg (A), AMNAV Maritime Services; Margot Brown (M), National Boating Federation; John M. Davey (A), Port of San Francisco; Capt. Tom Cullen, United States Coast Guard (USCG); Lt. Col. Laurence M. Farrell, United States Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE); Capt. Bruce Horton (M), San Francisco Bar Pilots (Bar Pilots); Daniel J. Massey (A) Foss Maritime Company; Capt. Patrick Murphy (M), Blue & Gold Fleet; Richard Nagasaki (M), Chevron Shipping Company; William Nickson (A), Transmarine Navigation Corporation; Gerry Wheaton (M), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

Alternates present, and those reporting to the HSC, Capt. Rick Holley, California Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR); Robert J. Lawrence, ACOE; Lt. Cmdr. Kevin Mohr, USCG; William Needham (A), National Boating Federation; Linda Scourtis (A), BCDC; Keith Stahnke (A), Water Emergency Transportation Authority (WETA); Lt. Cmdr. Drew Steadman, USCG.

The meetings are always open to the public.

Approval of the Minutes

There were corrections to the minutes of January 8, 2009:

Capt. Marc Bayer (M), Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company; was not in attendance.

Correct all examples of the last name of OSPR’s new Administrator as Edinger.

The last bullet of Comments by the Chair should begin “Mic Beatty. . .”

On page five at the Navigation Work Group Report, at the end of the seventh line, add the sentence: “The suggestions by Nagasaki and Brown were accepted as friendly amendments and there was no discussion or dissent.” At the end of that sentence add a paragraph break. Change the second sentence of the new second paragraph to read: “A motion to accept the recommendation, as amended, was . . .”
A motion to accept the amended minutes of January 8 was made, and seconded. The motion passed without discussion or dissent.

Comments by the Chair – Lundstrom

- **Lundstrom** will participate in a panel on safety lessons learned from marine accidents at the next National Harbor Safety Committee Conference. If you have suggestions on items to include in a nomination for our HSC to be National HSC of the Year, please forward them to **Lundstrom**. Details of the next conference can be found at [http://www.trb.org/conferences/2009/HSC/](http://www.trb.org/conferences/2009/HSC/).
- The Federal stimulus package includes 3.2 billion dollars for harbor operations and maintenance as well as three billion for new work. Congressman **George Miller**’s (D-California) office was working to secure funding for dredging Pinole Shoals.
- State Senator **Mark Leno** (D-San Francisco) has expressed interest in a briefing on the HSC’s efforts to prevent accidents. **Lundstrom** and **Berge** had given such a briefing to Assemblyman Jared Huffman (D-San Rafael).
- Governor **Arnold Schwarzenegger** had recommended closing the California Department of Boating and Waterways as part of his plan to close the budget deficit. The Department had helped fund the Physical Oceanographic Real Time System (PORTS) in the past.

Coast Guard Report – Capt. Cullen

- Educational outreach for the Transportation Worker Identity Card (TWIC) was ongoing. The TWIC regulations were scheduled to be implemented in the Bay Area at the end of February.
- Thanked the pilot onboard the *Overseas Cleliamar* for his quick thinking after the vessel lost propulsion and rudder control in the outbound lane near Point Diablo. He also thanked the Starlight Marine tug Z4 for being on the scene to assist within eight minutes. Capt. Mullen said that within twenty minutes an armada of vessels from Coast Guard, AMNAV Maritime, Foss Maritime, and Starlight Marine were on scene to assist. More details on the incident were given in Lt. Cmdr. Mohr’s report, which is attached to these minutes.
- Thanked the Prevention through People work group for their efforts to create an educational poster about hoax distress calls. Fifty-four percent of all distress calls in the Bay Area are a hoax, but the Coast Guard must respond to them as if they were real. The great fear is that scarce resources could be devoted to a hoax call in one part of the Bay Area when a real emergency might occur in a distant part of the area. The cost of responding is also a concern.

**Lt. Cmdr Mohr** read from a report attached to these minutes.

**Lt. Col. Farrell** said that an enforcement action was pending against the tanker *Omega Lady Miriam*. They are required to retrieve their lost anchor.
Capt. Horton asked if the failures on the Overseas Cleliamar and Mississippi Voyager were related to new state regulations requiring a switch to low sulfur diesel approaching the coast. Cmdr. Andrew Wood, USCG, said that the failure with the Mississippi Voyager did not seem related to fuel switching. He said that fuel system did seem to be an issue in the case of the Overseas Cleliamar. They were operating on low-sulfur fuel for their auxiliary engines, but the age of the fuel, and the setup of valves and piping seemed to be as much of an issue as the low-sulfur fuel. When asked if low sulfur fuel was the cause, Cmdr. Wood said that proper maintenance on the low-sulfur fuel system was not well maintained so it was difficult to assign the blame to low-sulfur fuel only.

Lundstrom asked the Coast Guard to keep track of incidents like this. She said that the safety override in the regulations was due to the HSC educating staff at the California Air Resources Bureau (CARB). CARB staff was interested in documenting safety issues resulting from the regulations. Berge said that the California regulation had been suspended by a Federal Court decision and that the vessel had voluntarily complied with the regulation. Berge said that a new regulation requiring low-sulfur fuel for auxiliary and main engines was in public comment period. Capt. Horton endorsed the idea of continued follow up on the safety issue because so many older vessels still in service were not built to run on low-sulfur fuel. Berge said that the International Maritime Organization would soon endorse low-sulfur fuel for all vessels regardless of build date.

Lt. Cmdr. Steadman said that a new approach buoy for the San Francisco bar channel was scheduled to be installed during the week following the HSC meeting.

Clearing House Report – Steinbrugge

Steinbrugge read from a report that is attached to these minutes.

OSPR Report – Capt. Holley

- Said that due to furloughs caused by lack of a state budget, administrative staff would respond in the event of an oil spill.
- OSPR is interested in the power-loss cases and would be following up.

NOAA Report – Wheaton

- A new catalog of Pacific Coast charts was due out.
- The weather was expected to remain rainy for a week to ten days. No flooding or high winds were expected. There would be bigger ocean swells off shore.

US Army Corp of Engineers (COE) Report – Lt. Col. Farrell
Mandated by the California Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990

- The new debris boat *Dillard* is named for Maj. Gen. John A. B. Dillard of the ACOE. He was killed in Vietnam in 1969 when the helicopter he was riding in was shot down. He was commander of all engineers in Vietnam at that time. Maj. Gen. Dillard had been in command of the Sacramento District prior to going to Vietnam. The *Dillard* is similar to the *Raccoon*. They are seeking upgrades for the *Grizzly*.

- The San Francisco office has published its first tide book. He said that they have some features in it not found in other tide books. They are looking for any suggestions for information to include in future editions.

- They are well prepared to quickly execute projects with any money coming from the Federal stimulus bill.

- Lt. Col. Farrell plans to attend future meetings of the HSC, or will be represented by the Maj. Adam T. Andrews, deputy commander, or Mike Dillabough, chief of operations and readiness.

Lawrence read a report that is attached to these minutes.

Wheaton asked for continuing information about the height of dredge materials at the Alcatraz dump site. Capt. Horton also expressed curiosity about the post-dredge surveys for Suisun Bay and Redwood City since they seemed to show less water than before the dredging. Lt. Col. Farrell said that he would check on the depths. They look forward to having the dredge Essayons and an early start on dredging this season.

Lundstrom said that there seemed to be continuing interest in the Alcatraz dump site and asked the committee if they would like a more detailed briefing in the future. Wheaton and Capt. Horton said that they were particularly interested in what the trigger point was to cause the ACOE to publicly announce less water. They said that pleasure boats and work boats like tugs regularly travel through the area.

State Lands Commission Report –

There was no one present from State Lands to report.

Lundstrom said that she had asked State Lands to report on the declining number of oil barrels since the tax on oil barrels is the source of funding for OSPR.

Tug Escort Work Group – Blankenberg

- Deferred to Lt. Cmdr. Mohr to summarize their recommended best practices for tugs with tows operating during severe weather.

Capt. Horton asked if the recommendations were meant to exclude light tugs. Lt. Cmdr. Mohr said that was correct. Sean Kelley, USCG, suggested that the language be amended to reflect that intent. This was taken as a friendly amendment, and there was no discussion or dissent. The first sentence of the second paragraph of the recommendation was amended to read “. . . during sever weather conditions for tugs with tows.” Capt. Horton suggested that to maintain consistency of language any example of “tugs and tows” should be
changed to “tugs with tows.” This too was treated as a friendly amendment and there was no discussion or dissent.

A motion to accept the amended recommendations was made and seconded. It passed without dissent.

Navigation Work Group – Capt. Horton

There was nothing to report.

Ferry Operations Work Group – Stahnke

- **Stahnke** summarized their recommendations for best practices during periods of reduced visibility and severe weather.

Stahnke then asked whether *extreme* was the proper word to describe weather since they wanted to be in accordance with the language of other recommended best practices. Capt. Horton said that *severe* was the commonly used term. This change was accepted as a friendly amendment without discussion or dissent.

Capt. Murphy said that it was a goal of the work group to create a matrix to record weather along the established ferry routes as a way to capture data for the annual review of recommended best practices.

Lundstrom thanked the work group for their efforts and noted that ferries carried over six million passengers per year in the Bay Area.

Berge asked if the Coast Guard had the authority to restrict ferry movements regardless of any decision made by the master or company operations manager. Lt. Cmdr. Mohr said that they did.

A motion to accept the amended recommendation was made and seconded. It passed without dissent.

Prevention Though People Work Group – Brown

- **Brown** summarized their recommended best practices for bunkering operations alongside cargo vessels and noted that they had been in place for about a year and a half.
Capt. Horton asked if the recommendations suggested that bunkering operations should cease while large vessels were passing those being bunkered. Lundstrom said that was a separate operational issue that would have to be taken up. She suggested that the title of the recommendation under consideration be changed to read: “Recommended best communications protocol . . .” This was accepted as a friendly amendment without discussion or dissent.

A motion to accept the recommendations, as amended, was made and seconded. It passed without dissent.

Plan Work Group – Scourtis

- She was working with Steinbrugge to get the Harbor Safety Plan ready for review by the HSC. The new recommended best practices would be included in new chapters and appendices. Other changes would be described by a cover document so that members could easily find them.

Lundstrom said that the National Transportation Safety Bureau had relied on the Harbor Safety Plan during their investigation of the COSCO Busan allision with the Bay Bridge, so the annual review of the plan was an important effort for the HSC.

PORTS Work Group – Capt. Amso

Read from a report that is attached to these minutes.

Lundstrom said that there was no guarantee of funding past the end of the fiscal year in June 2009. Capt. Korwatch said that funding for the next fiscal years still looked good, but that they were planning for two budget scenarios, one to include the enhancement described in the report, and one without. Wheaton said that there was nothing for Federal funding of PORTS in the 2009 or 2010 presidential budget recommendations.

PORTS Report – Steinbrugge

- The current meter at the Avon dock had been installed but was not yet online. Installation of the sensor for Amorco had been delayed until March. In March the San Francisco Ferry Building would be surveyed for locating a wind sensor. The Coast Guard hoped to have a buoy for the Oakland bar channel in April.

Public Comment

Capt. Korwatch announced that a workshop for the next round of grants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency would be held at the Port of Oakland following the HSC meeting of March 12.
Dave Sulouff, USCG, said that a proposed change to the Dumbarton railroad drawbridge would narrow horizontal clearance from one hundred twenty-five feet to one hundred one feet. He said that the HSC would receive an official notification of the proposed change by mail.

Stahnke said that by July 1, 2009 WETA must come up with a management plan for service in the event that bridges and other shore-side facilities are rendered inoperable. Anyone that would like to be involved in the planning process was invited to get in touch with him.

Old Business

There was none.

New Business

Lundstrom described the recent case of a near miss in the Los Angeles/Long Beach area between a freighter and a fishing vessel without a radio. She asked the HSC to consider whether to address the issue since, for the first time in many years, there was a representative of the fishing industry on the committee.

Next Meeting

Steinbrugge said that the next meeting would convene at 1000, March 12, 2009, in the 7th Floor Conference Room, Port of Oakland.

Adjournment

Lundstrom adjourned the meeting at 1158.

Respectfully submitted,

Captain Lynn Korwatch
Executive Secretary
## PORT SAFETY CATEGORIES

**Total Port Safety (PS) Cases opened for the period:**

1. **Total Number of Port State Control Detentions for period:**
   - SOLAS (2), MARPOL (1), ISM (0), ISPS (1)
   - 4

2. **Total Number of COTP Orders for the period:**
   - Navigation Safety (2), Port Safety & Security (6), ANOA (0)
   - 8

3. **Marine Casualties (reportable CG 2692) within SF Bay:**
   - Allision (0), Collision (0), Fire (0), Grounding (0), Sinking (0), Propulsion (3), Personnel (0), Other (1)
   - 4

4. **Total Number of (routine) Navigation Safety related issues / Letters of Deviation:**
   - Radar (1), Steering (0), Gyro (1), Echo sounder (0), AIS (0), AIS-835 (0)
   - 2

5. **Reported or Verified “Rule 9” or other Navigational Rule Violations within SF Bay:**
   - 0

6. **Significant Waterway events or Navigation related cases for the period:**
   - Loss of Propulsion T/V OVERSEAS C LELIAMAR
   - 1

7. **Maritime Safety Information Bulletins (MSIBs):**
   - MSIB 09-01
   - 1

## MARINE POLLUTION RESPONSE

**Total Oil/Hazmat Pollution Incidents within San Francisco Bay for Period**

* Source Identification (Discharges and potential Discharges):

**TOTAL VESSELS**

- Commercial Vessels
- Public Vessels (Military)
- Commercial Fishing Vessels
- Recreational Vessels

**TOTAL FACILITIES**

- Regulated Waterfront Facilities
- Other Land Sources

**UNKNOWN/UNCONFIRMED**

**Spill Information**

- Pollution Cases Requiring Clean-up
- Federally Funded Cases

**Oil Discharge and Hazardous Materials Release Volumes by Spill Size Category:**

1. Spills < 10 gallons
2. Spills 10 - 100 gallons
3. Spills 100 - 1000 gallons
4. Spills > 1000 gallons
5. Spills - Unknown

**Total Oil Discharge and/or Hazardous Material release volumes:**

1. Estimated spill amount from Commercial Vessels:
2. Estimated spill amount from Public Vessels:
3. Estimated spill amount from Commercial Fishing Vessels:
4. Estimated spill amount from Recreational Vessels:
5. Estimated spill amount from Regulated Waterfront Facilities:
6. Estimated spill amount from Other Land Sources:
7. Estimated spill amount from Unknown sources:

**Penalty Action:**

- Civil Penalty Cases for Period
- Notice of Violations (TKs)
- Letters of Warning
**SIGNIFICANT PORT SAFETY & SECURITY (PSS) CASES**

* A. MARINE CASUALTIES - PROPULSION / STEERING

Marine Casualty - Loss of Propulsion, Tug MILLENIUM STAR and Barge OLYMPIC SPIRIT (1 Jan): Tug reported a loss of its port engine while transiting north from LA, but was able to continue using its starboard engine. The tug master submitted a safe transit proposal to Sector SF, suggesting that an escort tug meet the MILLENIUM STAR during its northbound transit and relieve the tow when it was safe to do so. The proposal was accepted by the CG, and the MILLENIUM STAR was escorted by the tug PACIFIC FALCON, which ultimately took complete control of the barge in Anch 5 on 4 Jan. The loss of power was caused by a cracked engine block, and repairs pend in Alameda.

Marine Casualty - Loss of Propulsion, T/V MISSISSIPPI VOYAGER (2 Jan): Vessel reported a momentary loss of electrical power and propulsion while inbound approximately 120 NM west of the Sea Buoy. A COTP Order was issued requiring tug assist and completion of necessary repairs prior to departing SF Bay. The loss of power was caused by an over speeding #3 generator resulting from damaged wiring in its governor junction box, which then tripped off the other operating diesel generator. Wiring repairs were completed on 2 Jan, and the COTP Order was lifted.

Marine Casualty - Loss of Propulsion, T/V OVERSEAS CLELIAMAR (27 Jan): The ballasted tank vessel reported a loss of propulsion and rudder control while outbound in the vicinity of Point Diablo and dropped its starboard anchor to prevent grounding. All tanks were sounded with no change in readings, and no pollution was discovered by CG vessels on scene. Power and propulsion was restored to the vessel upon switching fuel tank supply, and the vessel proceeded to Anch 9, under tug escort until an investigation could be completed. The loss of power was caused by a clogged fuel line to ship generators and a class survey indicating completed repairs was submitted on 29 Jan. The vessel was required to depart under tug escort and the COTP Order was lifted upon departure of SF Bay.

* B. MARINE CASUALTIES - VESSEL SAFETY CONDITIONS

Marine Casualty - Anchor Casualty, T/V OMEGA LADY MIRIAM (5 Jan): While departing Anch 9, vessel lost its port anchor at the shackle as the vessel was retrieving its anchor. Vessel owners contracted a dive team to locate the anchor, and Contra Costa County conducted a sonar survey both with negative results. The anchor is believed to be at a depth of 36-38 ft in mud and does not pose an immediate hazard to navigation. A joint NOAA/ACOE/USCG project to locate the anchor using NOAA's magnometer pends, and an LNM has been published (52/08) communicating its estimated position.

* C. COAST GUARD - GENERAL SAFETY/SECURITY CASES

Port Safety - STCW / SOLAS Detention, T/V BUM SHIN (4 Jan): Sec SF Port State Control issued a COTP Order directing the inbound vessel to Anch #9 for a Certificate of Compliance Inspection based on reported shortfalls to the vessel's Minimum Safe Manning requirements. Vessel was detained until the manning requirements for a chief engineer were satisfied. A satisfactory examination was conducted on 8 Jan and the detention was lifted.

Port Safety - COTP Order, T/V SICHEM EVA (4 Jan): Sec SF Port State Control issued a COTP Order directing the inbound vessel to Anch #9 to inspect and repair a fracture within the #3 port cargo tank. A satisfactory class society examination was conducted on 16 Jan indicating repairs and the COTP Order was lifted.

Port Safety - ISPS Detention, T/V SYLVIE (11 Jan): Sec SF Port State Control issued a COTP Order directing the vessel to Anch 9 upon arrival for an ISPS Exam based on risk of previous port calls. A satisfactory examination was conducted the next morning and the detention was lifted.

Port Safety - SOLAS Detention, T/V JAG PRADIP (9 Jan): Sec SF issued a COTP Order detaining the vessel to the SF Bay until all of the 35 noted deficiencies encountered during a Certificate of Compliance examination were addressed. An additional COTP Order was issued to the vessel requiring a reduction of the oxygen level in cargo tanks while in SF Bay to comply with cargo storage regulations for the ultra low sulfur diesel fuel cargo. CG recommended an external audit to be completed by the Flag Representative for conformity with ISM Code. Five non-conformities were noted and cleared on 16 Jan. A satisfactory class technician report was sent for the remaining SOLAS deficiencies on 19 Jan and the COTP orders were lifted.

Port Safety - MARPOL Detention, T/V VOYAGER A (17 Jan): Sec SF issued a COTP Order directing the vessel to halt cargo operations and liquid transfers upon discovery of oil in designated ballast tanks. No oil was discovered in the waters surrounding the vessel. Class inspection for cause and subsequent repairs are still pending.

* D. COAST GUARD - NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY

Navigation Safety - LOD Inop 3 cm Radar, ATB GALVESTON (6 Jan): Vessel was granted an inbound LOD for an inoperative 3 cm radar. Repairs were conducted by technician on 9 Jan and the LOD was lifted.

Navigation Safety - LOD Inop Gyro, T/V OVERSEAS CLELIAMAR (30 Jan): Vessel was granted an outbound LOD for inoperative gyrocompass repeaters to be replaced at its next port.

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT MANAGEMENT DIVISION (IMD) CASES:

None.

SIGNIFICANT PORT SAFETY INFORMATION or EXERCISES

None.
San Francisco Clearinghouse Report

February 12, 2009

❖ In January the clearinghouse called OSPR twice regarding possible escort violations.
❖ In January the clearinghouse was notified of one vessel arriving at the Pilot Station without escort paperwork.
❖ In January there were 130 tank vessels arrivals; 7 Chemical Tankers, 17 Chemical/Oil Tankers, 32 Crude Oil Tankers, 2 LPGs, 33 Product Tankers, and 39 tugs with barges.
❖ In January there were 326 total arrivals.
## San Francisco Bay Region Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanker arrivals to San Francisco Bay</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barge arrivals to San Francisco Bay</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tanker and Barge Arrivals</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tank ship &amp; tank barge movements</td>
<td>502</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank ship movements</td>
<td>313</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escorted tank ship movements</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unescorted tank ship movements</td>
<td>160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank barge movements</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escorted tank barge movements</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unescorted tank barge movements</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages above are percent of total tank ship & tank barge movements for each item.

## Escorts reported to OSPR

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total movements</td>
<td>965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unescorted movements</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escorted movements</td>
<td>474</td>
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## Movements by Zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movements by Zone</th>
<th>Zone 1</th>
<th>Zone 2</th>
<th>Zone 4</th>
<th>Zone 6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Unescorted moves</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>250</td>
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<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank ships</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>313</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank barges</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>178</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escorted moves</td>
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<td>103</td>
<td>474</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank ships</td>
<td>91</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>301</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank barges</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>173</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Information is only noted for zones where escorts are required.
2. All percentages are percent of total movements for the zone.
3. Every movement is counted in each zone transited during the movement.
4. Total movements is the total of all unescorted movements and all escorted movements.
Harbor Safety Committee
Of the San Francisco Bay Region

Report of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San Francisco District
February 12, 2009

1. CORPS FY 2009 O&M DREDGING PROGRAM

The following is this year’s O & M dredging program for San Francisco Bay.

   a. Main Ship Channel – A condition survey will be conducted soon; hopefully this
      month. Dredging is scheduled for this May, with the Essayons. Disposal is proposed at
      the Ocean Beach disposal Site.

   b. Richmond Outer Harbor (and Richmond Long Wharf) – Dredging is scheduled for
      mid-June, with the Essayons. Disposal at the Alcatraz Disposal Site.

   c. Richmond Inner Harbor – Dredging is scheduled for this June. The Corps has
      arranged with NOAA Fisheries dredging on May 1, one month before the official work
      window opens. Disposal is scheduled for the Hamilton Marsh Restoration Project.

   d. Oakland O & M Dredging – The Corps is in discussions with NOAA Fisheries to
      begin dredging the Outer Harbor in July 2009; the Inner Harbor is scheduled for a
      September 2009 start.

   e. Suisun Bay Channel – Dredging is scheduled to begin August 1.

   f. Pinole Shoal - Dredging is scheduled to begin June 1, with the Essayons. Disposal at
      the San Pablo Bay Disposal Site.

   g. Redwood City/San Bruno Shoal – Dredging is completed.

2. DEBRIS REMOVAL - The debris totals for January 2009: Grizzly - 25 tons, underway
   most days; Raccoon - 15 tons, underway 2 days; Safe Boat - 5 tons, also assists Grizzly.
3. UNDERWAY OR UPCOMING HARBOR IMPROVEMENTS

**Oakland 50-ft Deepening Project** – Clean-up dredging of the Outer Harbor is still on-going. The Inner Harbor deepening is on-going. **No change.**

4. EMERGENCY (URGENT & COMPELLING) DREDGING

There has been no emergency dredging in FY 2009.

5. OTHER WORK

   a. **San Francisco Bay to Stockton**  The project team conducted two very successful public scoping meetings - on March 26 and April 2, co-hosted by local sponsors Port of Stockton and Contra Costa County Water Agency. This project is moving forward. **Nothing new to report.**

   b. **Sacramento River Deep Water Ship Channel Deepening**  FY 2008 money will be carried over to FY 2009 and used for continued testing and disposal site evaluation. **Nothing new to report.**

6. HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY UPDATE

Address of Corps’ web site for completed hydrographic surveys. **New surveys.**

http://www.spn.usace.army.mil/hydrosurvey/

Main Ship Channel: Survey completed in January 2009 has been posted.
Pinole Shoal: **Condition surveys completed in December 2008 and January 2009 have been posted.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grizzly</th>
<th>Raccoon</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Feb. 2008</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>March</td>
<td>16.50</td>
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<td>April</td>
<td>35.00</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2009</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>145.00</td>
<td>106.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Suisun Bay Channel, New York Slough: Surveys completed in December 2008 and January 2009 have been posted.
Suisun Bay Channel: Surveys dated December 2008 and January 2009 have been posted.
Redwood City: Survey completed in January 2009 has been posted.
San Bruno Shoal: Surveys completed in February and March 2008 have been posted.
Oakland Entrance Channel: Surveys completed in October and November 2008 have been posted.
Oakland Outer Harbor: Surveys completed in October and November 2008 have been posted.
Southampton Shoal and Richmond Long Wharf: Surveys completed in January 2009 have been posted.
Richmond Inner Harbor: Surveys completed in January 2009 have been posted.
North Ship Channel: Surveys completed 12-13 and 20-21 March 2008 have been posted.
San Leandro Marina: Surveys completed in January 2008 have been posted.
Larkspur Ferry Terminal: Surveys completed in July 2008 have been posted.
Mare Island Strait Channel: Surveys completed in August 2008 have been posted.
Disposal Site Condition Surveys: SF-09 (Carquinez); SF-10 (San Pablo Bay); and SF-11 (Alcatraz) – January 2009.

The Alcatraz survey from January 2009 indicated the high spot is dispersing (-28+); I have directed two recent dredge projects to dispose in the disposal cells on the north side of the site.
# Vessel Transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Transfers</th>
<th>Total Vessel Monitors</th>
<th>Total Transfer Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1 - 31, 2008</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>52.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1 - 31, 2009</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>47.92</td>
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# Crude Oil / Product Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Crude Oil (D)</th>
<th>Crude Oil (L)</th>
<th>Overall Product (D)</th>
<th>Overall Product (L)</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>January 1 - 31, 2008</td>
<td>183,564,310</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>267,142,712</td>
<td>164,464,349</td>
<td>431,607,061</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1 - 31, 2009</td>
<td>15,735,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,401,000</td>
<td>13,158,469</td>
<td>36,559,469</td>
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# Oil Spill Total

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Terminal</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Gallons Spilled</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1 - 31, 2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>January 1 - 31, 2009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Disclaimer:**
Please understand that the data is provided to the California State Lands Commission from a variety of sources; the Commission cannot guarantee the validity of the data provided to it.
FERRY OPERATIONS WORK GROUP

To: Harbor Safety Committee
From: Pat Murphy, Work Group Chair
Re: Guidelines for Ferries Navigating in Reduced Visibility and Extreme Weather
Date: February 12, 2009

_______________________________________________________

Background

Navigating the San Francisco Bay Region during periods of reduced visibility requires mariners to exercise additional caution and vigilance. The safe speed of ferry operations in reduced visibility is based on a number of factors as described in the Rules of the Road (COLREGS) including maneuverability, draft, vessel congestion, manning, and radar capabilities. Passenger ferries are highly maneuverable with short stopping distances and have a shallow draft which enables operation outside of shipping channels. Ferries in the San Francisco Bay Area also follow fixed routes as prescribed in the HSC Ferry Routing Protocol, which adds predictability and reduces the risk of collision. A safe speed for a ferry vessel can be quite different from a deep draft ship or tug and barge along the same route. In addition to Rules of the Road and USCG regulatory requirements, each Ferry operator has developed specific safety procedures.

Ferry Operations Work Group

The Bay Area’s three commute ferry companies/agencies agreed to work with the Harbor Safety Committee, Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), the Water Transit Authority and stakeholder parties to develop a protocol safe for ferry navigation in the San Francisco and San Pablo Bays.

The Ferry Operations Work Group conducted a two-year process to develop an approach and maneuvering scheme in the vicinity of the congested San Francisco Ferry Building, as well as a routing protocol in the Central Bay to decrease the risk of collision for commute ferries. The Work Group agreed to protocols and referred them to the Harbor Safety Committee, which adopted the Work Group findings and recommendations in May 2008.

Ferry Traffic Routing Protocol

The Ferry Traffic Routing Protocol consists of planned routes and communications procedures for improving ferry navigation safety. When ferries follow routes, the Closest Point of Approach (CPAs) with other ferries is greatest at points where speeds are typically greatest. The adopted routes cross at predetermined locations at nearly right angles, enabling ferries to predict crossing situations and plan ahead.

Within an approximately ½-mile zone around the San Francisco Ferry Building, the protocol calls for port-to-port meeting and heightened radio communications. For inbound Ferry Building ferries, the protocol requires planning far enough in advance to avoid getting within approximately ½ nautical mile from the Ferry Building if another ferry is still at the inbounder’s dock.
This reduces crowding around the Ferry Building. With ferry routes charted on nautical charts, other types of vessels can more easily predict the locations of ferries and steer clear. The Ferry Traffic Routing Protocol supports aggressive use of electronic nautical charts (ENCs) with intergraded Automatic Identification System (AIS). When all ferries consistently update their AIS data and follow routes, the protocol will ultimately lead to reduced VTS-ferry communications.

More recently, S.F. Bay Area ferry operators have participated in the Ferry Operations Work Group to develop common best maritime practices for operation in inclement weather.

San Francisco Bay Area Ferry Operation in Inclement Weather

Microclimates
As described in the Harbor Safety Plan, localized microclimates can alter visibility along an entire route or a portion of a route. During summer, channel fog is prevalent in the central San Francisco Bay with outer areas clear. In winter months Tule fog can be wide spread, dense in the morning with clearing later in the day.

Safety Practices
The Master of a ferry is the person in charge of the vessel, responsible for the safety of the passengers and crew at all times, and has the authority to decide if it is safe to get underway or to proceed.

In reduced visibility and inclement weather conditions, the following practices are followed:

- **A go or no-go decision** to get underway is made by the vessel Master or the company Operation Manager, based on conditions along the entire route, using all available information including the experience of the master and operations manager.

- **Look-outs**: the vessel Master assigns crewmembers for look-out duty based on the existing or anticipated conditions; the applicable regulations are found in the Navigation Rules and Regulations, Rule 5 Look-out (text attached).

- **Safe speed**: the vessel is required to proceed at a speed appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions, which include state of visibility and the manageability of the vessel with special reference to stopping distance and turning ability. Other factors include participation in fixed ferry routes, wind advisories issued by NOAA, sea state, traffic density, and applicable Navigation Rules and Regulations (see attached verbiage from Rule 6 Safe Speed).

- **Equipment**: each Ferry is required to have at minimum one radar; commuter ferry vessels generally have two operational radars onboard; the vessel Master is required to have a radar observer license endorsement. Global Positioning Satellite, Automatic Identification System and Electronic Charting navigation systems are also installed and used to assist navigation.
In conditions of high wind and waves:

- **Go/no-go** decision is made by the vessel Master or the company Operation Manager, based on conditions along the entire route, using all available information including the experience of the master and operations manager. Factors to be considered include size of the vessel, direction of the winds and seas, orientation of departure and arrival piers to prevailing conditions, and limitations of ferries to travel at slower speeds.

- **Passenger safety**: Captain can maneuver the vessel to minimize wave effects. Crew duties include rough weather announcements and passenger safety management.

### High Speed Ferry Operations (over 30 Knots)

U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars (NAVIC) 5-01 and 5-01 Change 1 provide specific guidance for high speed passenger vessels and include approved vessel operation manuals, training programs and risk assessment tools (matrix).

- **Vessel equipment**: operators have exceeded minimum requirements for navigation electronics including dual radar, Global Position Satellite and electronic charting with Automatic Identification System overlay.

- **Manning/Training**: Vessels traveling at high speed are required to have a minimum of two qualified watch-standers during normal operations. Vessel operators have developed approved training programs for high speed navigation in compliance with NAVIC 5-01 and 5-01 Change 1.

### U.S. Coast Guard Authority to Regulate Vessel Speed

The Federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (33USC1223) grants authority to the Coast Guard to further regulate vessel speed, and specifically states:

> [The Coast Guard] may control vessel traffic in areas subject to the jurisdiction of the United States which the Secretary [of the Department of Homeland Security] determines to be hazardous, or under conditions of reduced visibility, adverse weather, vessel congestion, or other hazardous circumstances by a number of means, including establishing vessel traffic routing schemes and by establishing vessel size, speed, draft limitations and vessel operating conditions.

Under 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 161.11, the Coast Guard may, through the Vessel Traffic System (VTS), issue measures or directions to enhance navigation and vessel safety and to protect the marine environment, including establishing vessel traffic routing schemes.

### International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGS)

Maritime practices accepted worldwide are codified under the International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), which address look-outs, safe transit speed, risk of collision, and conduct of vessels in restricted visibility.
Rule 5, Look-outs, states that “Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.”

Rule 6 states, in part, that, “Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that the vessel can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions.” Rule 6 continues, stating that factors to be taken into account in determining a safe speed include, but are not limited to, the state of visibility and the manageability of the vessel with special reference to stopping distance and turning ability in the prevailing conditions.

Rule 7 addresses risk of collision, and states, in part, that, “Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist.”

Rule 19, Conduct of Vessels in Restricted Visibility, states, in part, that, “Every vessel shall proceed at a safe speed adapted to the prevailing circumstances and conditions of restricted visibility [and] every vessel shall have due regard to the prevailing circumstances and conditions of restricted visibility when complying with the Rules....”

**Ferry Operations Work Group Recommendations to Harbor Safety Committee**

1. The Work Group recommends that the “Guidelines for Ferries Navigating in Reduced Visibility and Extreme Weather” be added to the San Francisco Harbor Safety Plan.

2. The Work Group recommends the Harbor Safety Committee review the “Guidelines for Ferries Navigating in Reduced Visibility and Extreme Weather” within one year of adoption.
To: Harbor Safety Committee  
From: Margot Brown, Work Group Chair  
Re: Recommended Best Practices for Safe Bunkering Operations Alongside Cargo Vessels  
Date: February 12, 2009

Background

In early 2006 in response to three near misses in the Bay Area involving equipment falling from cargo ships onto barges and tugs pulled alongside, the Prevention Through People (PTP) Work Group took up the issue of improving the safety of bunkering operations for barge and tug crews. The Work Group talked with industry through 2006-2007 on the subject of falling containers and equipment; the COTP sent a letter to local representatives of the ILWU expressing concern about safety during cargo operations.

The Work Group provided a forum for industry discussion, and after several discussion, measures were agreed to be instituted that include placement of deck signage indicating where barge work was being done to direct ship hands away from that area.

Updates during 2007 showed improvement in communication between tug and barge companies and cargo vessel operators. The industry-PTP group adopted a process for increased communication among the various parties involved with cargo loading and bunkering processes which contributed to safer operations. The PTP Work Group previously reported this Best Practice to the Harbor Safety Committee that was not formally adopted at the time. These safety measures were shared with other West Coast HSCs, and were adopted in the LA/LB Harbor Safety Plan.

The Prevention Through People Work Group recommends the HSC adopt the following Best Practice:

**Container Vessel Bunker Barge Safety Program and Delivery Notice**

- This document outlines the process for essential communication between the agents, bunker barge operators (tankermen) and terminal’s Marine Department to ensure a safe and productive work environment.
- The Container Operator has adopted this Best Management Practices Program and has instituted it to assist all parties involved in the vessel operations when vessel bunkering is involved in the operation.
- The “Bunker Delivery Notice” will be available on line at [http://www.sfmx.org](http://www.sfmx.org) and a copy of it appears on Page 4 of this Appendix.
- The Agent will e-mail the notice to the Ship, Terminal and the Bunker Barge operator prior to the stevedoring operation.
- The terminal, ship and barge operator will reply to the E-mail by including the contact phone/cell number of the person working that vessel/shift.
This will be the cross-check that all parties are aware of a planned bunkering operation.

**Essential Communications: Contact between the Tankerman and Terminal**

- The Bunker Barge Operator (Tankerman/Person in Charge/PIC) must contact the Designated Facility Contact prior to beginning the barge operation.
- This will allow the tankerman/PIC to learn the planned stevedore operation in the CFS/CLO and highlight any possible conflicts. (A Check Sheet shall be used for this function.)
- The Bunker Barge representative (tankerman/PIC), must communicate with the Designated Facility Contact, and Chief Engineer/Chief Mate, (vessel PIC) prior to beginning the barge operation. This will allow the tankerman to learn the planned stevedore operation and highlight any possible conflicts so they may be eliminated.

**Essential Communications: Tankerman Check Sheet**

- a. What are the bay designations directly forward and aft of the house on this vessel that overlap the bunker barge?
- b. Is there any planned loading, discharging, or lashing in these bays?
- c. When does the terminal plan to work these bays?
- d. Is any of the work in these bays going to extend into the two or three offshore positions?
- e. Can these positions be worked in a specific time frame so possible conflicts are avoided?
- f. What time periods is the stevedore going to shut down cargo operations for breaks, lunch, etc.?

**Understanding the Bunkering Process #1**

- Vessels contract for Bunkers
  - Oil Companies notify barge operators
  - Agents coordinate delivery notifications with barge operators and terminals
  - Bunker Barge arrival time and duration of pumping is established

**Understanding the Bunkering Process #2**

- Vessel Arrives for Cargo Operations
- Agent Coordinates bunker barge arrival
- Terminal plans operations
- Cargo Flow Sheet or Crane letter of Operations (CFS or CLO) is prepared
  - Outlines what cargo is to be moved in what sequence
  - Terminal will plan around bunker operations if possible
- Terminal gives CFS/CLO to Agent to pass to Chief Engineer/PIC and Tankerman/PIC

**Understanding the Bunkering Process #3**

- Bunker Barge Arrives for Bunker Ops
– Optimal placement to minimize exposure.
– Vessel insures BUNKER OPERATION SIGN is posted.
– DOI is signed by Chief Engineer/PIC and Tankerman/PIC.
– Tankerman/PIC /Chief Mate/Chief Engineer/PIC will have a copy of Cargo Flow Sheet or Crane letter (CFS/CLO).
  • Tankerman/PIC should understand what cargo adjacent to the barge is to be handled and when.
  • Tankerman/PIC shall have contact with the vessel Superintendent at all times.

Understanding the Bunkering Process #4

• Vessel cargo operations commence.
  – Lashers sent aboard to unlash containers.
  – Crane lowered over hold/hatch to be worked.
• Work commences in accordance with CFS/CLO
  – Lashers sent aboard to re-lash containers
• Bunker operations could start before, during or after cargo operations
  – Tankerman/PIC, Chief Mate & Superintendent must understand where the stevedoreoperator is relative to the Cargo Flow Sheet or Crane letter and the bunkering process.

Area or Zone of Concern

• Tankerman/PIC, Terminal Personnel, (Superintendents, Foremen, Lashers, Crane Operators) and Vessel Personnel (Chief Mate and Engineer/PIC) all must be mindful of and take particular care when lashing or cargo operations take place in the outer three stacks of containers in bays adjacent to the bunker barge if the transfer is in progress.

Essential Communications: BUNKER DELIVERY NOTICE

• To inform all concerned parties of the planned bunkering operations, the Vessel Agent (or other carrier assigned representative), will complete a “Bunker Delivery Notice”.
  • The Agent will forward the notice by E-mail to BOTH the terminal and the bunker barge operator prior to the start of any stevedoring operation.

Post Incident Response

• It is expected that the Tankerman will be alert to the crane working near the barge and the cargoflow that has been planned.
  • It is expected that the Tankerman/PIC will determine the proper action to take regarding oil transfer process should any incident occur which affects the safety of the operation.
  • Any incident will require direct communications between the parties involved who shall be readily available. This will allow for adjustments to working plans to correct conflicts.
Long Term Incident Resolution

- It is expected that the Operations Department’s management personnel, vessel representative, and the barge operator will discuss mutually agreeable adjustments to minimize tankerman exposures that may be determined as the result of the incident and the post incident investigation.
- Ideas and lessons learned will be shared between all parties including the other Port Terminals.

Bunker Delivery Notice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Port:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vessel:</td>
<td>Voyage:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference #:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunker Barge Co. &amp; Phone:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Bunker Barge:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Bunker Barge PIC:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contact Phone # of Barge PIC:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunker Barge Emergency Contact #:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount and type to be bunkered:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery Time of Bunkers:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of Delivery of Bunkers:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunker Barge to Land Side to as Vessel (select Port or Starboard):</td>
<td>Port or Starboard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated duration of bunker delivery:</td>
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<td>Designated Facility Contact:</td>
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<td>Terminal Emergency Phone #:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of Vessel PIC for bunkers:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telephone number of vessel:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location of Bunker Manifold/Riser:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent for Vessel:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent Cell Phone #:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent 24 Hour Contact #:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The winter months from November to February typically bring storm systems to the Bay area that result in high winds and adverse sea conditions. Winds shift frequently and have a wide range of speeds dependent on the procession of offshore high and low pressure systems. The strongest winds tend to come from the Southeast to Southwest ahead of a cold front. Extreme wind conditions of 50 knots gusting to 75 knots have occurred during the winter, occasionally requiring the San Francisco Bar to be closed to tug and tow traffic.

The Tug Escort Work Group met January 15, 2009 to develop best practices during severe weather conditions for tugs and tugs with tows. The best practices are meant to serve as guidelines, and are not meant to relieve the mariner of his or her responsibility to follow applicable rules and regulations addressing prudent seamanship. Furthermore, they are designed to address vessels in the service of routine cargo transport, and are not meant to prohibit tug rescue or salvage operations.

Factors to consider when closing the Bar or limiting transits in the Bay

A number of factors must be considered when limiting transits in the Bay or closing the Bar due to severe weather, including sea state, tidal influences, visibility, traffic density, and wind advisories issued by NOAA. The size and condition of the vessels being addressed must also be considered. The Tug Escort Work Group recommends a tiered approach, applying greater caution as conditions worsen.

Sustained winds exceeding 25 knots in the Bay

- Tugs with tows should closely evaluate whether it is safe to transit in the Bay. Size and sail area of the vessel, tidal influences, visibility, operator skill and traffic density should all be considered.
- VTS San Francisco will establish regular communications with bridge watches of VTS users in Bay Area anchorages, and more closely monitor swing circles to ensure vessels are not dragging.

Sustained winds exceeding 40 knots in the Bay

- Transits to and from berths are not recommended, but may be performed following a careful risk management evaluation by the vessel operator and vessel management.
**Sustained winds exceeding 40 knots and/or seas exceed 12 ft at the Sea Buoy**

- Bar traffic restrictions and closure should be considered for tugs and tows. Size of the vessel, draft, swell period, tidal influences, visibility, and traffic density should all be considered. Strong ebb tides should be avoided, and a minimum of 10 feet under-keel clearance is recommended.

**Recommendations to Harbor Safety Committee**

The Tug Escort Workgroup recommends approval of these guidelines and their addition to the Harbor Safety Plan. The workgroup also recommends that the Captain of the Port document bar closures in the monthly Harbor Safety Committee Coast Guard Report, including the different factors considered and the weather conditions at the time of closure.
Introduction

The Tug Escort Work Group met January 15, 2009 to address issues related to navigating San Francisco Bay in inclement weather, specifically, those affecting tugs with tows under 1600GT transiting during reduced visibility.

Context

Navigating the San Francisco Bay Region during periods of reduced visibility requires mariners to exercise additional caution and vigilance. The Bay region, consisting of several bays and rivers, is one of the foggiest harbors in the United States. In-Bay distances are long. There is not a single regional climate, but a series of microclimates with variable fog. During summer, 30 to 40 percent of parts of the Bay may experience foggy conditions. In winter, the fog may be denser, originating from a different direction than summer fog.

Recommended Guidelines for Navigating in Reduced Visibility

These best practices should be used by the mariner when planning, initiating or navigating a transit in the Bay during periods of reduced visibility. They acknowledge that the size of a tug and tow have much to do with their maneuverability, and therefore, are limited to tugs with tows with a combined displacement of less than 1600GT. Finally, the best practices are meant to serve as guidelines, and are not meant to relieve the mariner of his or her responsibility to follow applicable rules and regulations addressing prudent seamanship including the requirement of the International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea, or COLREGS.

Critical Maneuvering Areas (CMAs): There are areas within the Bay where additional standards of care are required due to the restrictive nature of the channel, proximity of hazards, or the prevalence of adverse currents. Tugs with tows should not transit through CMAs when visibility is less than 0.25 nautical miles. Tugs with tows in petroleum service should not transit through CMAs when visibility is less than 0.5 nautical miles.

Locations within the Bay identified as Critical Maneuvering Areas:
Redwood Creek
San Mateo-Hayward Bridge
Oakland Bar Channel*
Islais Creek Channel
Richmond Inner Harbor
Richmond-San Rafael Bridge, East Span
Union Pacific Bridge
New York Slough, up-bound
Rio Vista Lift Bridge

*Note: the Oakland Bar Channel is identified due to cross currents and its proximity to the Bay Bridge and Yerba Buena Island.

**Vessels docked:** Tugs with tows at a dock within the Bay should not commence a movement if visibility is less than 0.25 nautical miles at the dock. Tugs with tows in petroleum service at a dock within the Bay should not commence a movement if visibility is less than 0.5 nautical miles at the dock.

**Vessels proceeding to dock:** Tugs with tows proceeding to a dock should anchor if visibility at the dock is known to be less than 0.25 nautical miles, unless, under all circumstances, proceeding to the dock is the safest option. Tugs with tows in petroleum service proceeding to a dock should anchor if visibility at the dock is known to be less than 0.5 nautical miles, unless, under all circumstances, proceeding to the dock is the safest option.

Note: Vessel captains or operators should notify VTS upon determination that a scheduled movement will be delayed or cancelled. If underway, they shall make a sailing plan deviation report per VTS regulations.

**Tug Escort Recommendations to the Harbor Safety Committee:**

1. The Work Group recommends that the “Guidelines for Navigating in Reduced Visibility for Tugs with Tows Less Than 1600GT” be added to the San Francisco Harbor Safety Plan.

2. The Work Group recommends the Harbor Safety Committee review the “Guidelines for Navigating in Reduced Visibility for Tugs with Tows Less Than 1600GT” within one year of adoption.
PORTS Report

Feb 12, 2009

PORTS Work group report:

The PORTS work group met Jan. 15 at CSLC offices in Hercules.

**Budget**

Boating and Waterways is no longer contributing to PORTS. I would like to thank them for their past contributions and participation.

Presently PORTS is waiting for OSPR to finalize an additional grant of $300 k from the OSPAf fund through Fish and Game. These monies if approved are to be used $230 k for capital improvements and $70 k for O&M.


There is no funding past June 2009.

Julie Thomas (Scripts) and Heather Kerkering (CENCOOS) gave a presentation on CDIP part of the California Coastal Ocean Observing System and Products. The PORTS work group reached out to them looking for synergies for PORTS. They manage the ocean observation buoys on the coast and more importantly the San Francisco wave buoy. This buoy is used as a tool to monitor wave height at the bar. The PORTS Work Group is considering a request from them to provide funding for a replacement bar buoy, $80 k. If provided this would enable 365 days/year coverage of bar conditions. Presently it takes about 30-40 days to refurbish the buoy.

The PORTS work group through NOAA, Gerry Wheaton, is looking at other existing sensors in the bay to enhance and enlarge the PORTS system rather than add additional stand alone sensors. Heather Kerkering from CeNCOOS is compiling a list of other weather and ocean sensors located within San Francisco Bay that may be useful to the maritime community. We are presently looking at the availability of salinity data in the bay. The purpose is to provide one stop shopping for PORTS data with the ultimate aim of providing real time tides and currents to electronic charts. Ms. Kerkering will be presenting this package at the March 2009 PORTS meeting.
Status of PORTS sensors

- Richmond Southampton Shoal Buoy R6 current meter – operational data available but not on PORTS text page
- Amorco current meter - operational
- Avon current meter – operational but data not yet available
- MET at Amorco installation has been delayed.
- The site review for the Ferry bldg wind bird will take place at the time of the Amorco Met installation.
- Awaiting a buoy from USCG for the Oakland Bar Channel priority no. 1
- Awaiting a buoy for the Anchorage #9 current meter priority no. 2 – possible grant money install
- MET at Pier 80 – possible grant money install - cancelled, no longer deemed necessary with the installation of pier 27.
- MET at Pier 27 – possible grant money install
- MET at Rodeo – possible grant money install –
- MET at Army Pt.- possible grant money install

Next meeting
March 5th at CSCL in Hercules at 1000.

Respectfully,

Captain Marc Bayer